WASHINGTON -- Since 2008, the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation’s Federal Aviation Administration have identified a variety of risks related to Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out technology that could adversely affect DoD security and missions. However, they have not approved any solutions to address these risks. Compared with other tracking technology, ADS-B Out provides more information, such as an aircraft’s precise location, velocity, and airframe dimensions, and better enables real-time and historical flight tracking. Individuals-including adversaries-could track military aircraft equipped with ADS-B Out technology, presenting risks to physical security and operations.

This readily available public information allowed GAO to track various kinds of military aircraft. ADS-B Out is also vulnerable to electronic warfare and cyber-attacks.

Since FAA is planning to divest radars as part of ADS-B implementation, homeland defense could also be at risk, since the North American Aerospace Defense Command relies on information from FAA radars to monitor air traffic. DoD and FAA have drafted a memorandum of agreement that focuses on equipping aircraft with ADS-B Out but does not address specific security risks. Unless DoD and FAA focus on these risks and approve one or more solutions in a timely manner, they may not have time to plan and execute actions that may be needed before January 1, 2020-when all aircraft are required to be equipped with ADS-B Out technology.

Of the eight tasks associated with the implementation of ADS-B Out technology in the 2007 DoD NextGen memorandum-issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to ensure that the NextGen vision for the future national airspace system met DOD’s requirements and the appropriate management of DoD’s resources-DoD has implemented two, has partially implemented four, and has not implemented two.

DoD has established a joint program office and identified a lead service, but it has only partially validated ADS-B Out requirements, developed a directive, issued an implementation plan, and incorporated NextGen into the planning, budgeting, and programming process. DoD has not taken significant action to integrate the needs and requirements of DoD components related to ADS-B into cohesive plans and policies for inclusion in NextGen joint planning and development, and has not provided periodic and recurring NextGen progress reports to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. As a result of DoD not fully implementing the 2007 NextGen memorandum, DoD components have lacked direction and cohesion while trying to address FAA’s requirement to equip military aircraft.

GAO is recommending that DoD and FAA approve one or more solutions to address ADS-B -related security risks; and that DoD implement key tasks to facilitate consistent, long-term planning and implementation of NextGen. DoD and the Department of Transportation generally concurred and described planned actions to implement the recommendations.

Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office
Associated URL: gao.gov